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Highlights 
• Electrified fences are used as a technical panacea to human-elephant conflict 
• Politics underpin the technical and anti-political process of fence construction 
• Fences embody the power dynamics and politics of stakeholders 
• Fences define territory which is captured by different political interests  
 
Abstract 
Conservation is a fundamentally spatial pursuit.  Human-elephant conflict (HEC), in 
particular crop-raiding, is a significant and complex conservation problem wherever 
elephants and people occupy the same space. Conservationists and wildlife managers 
build electrified fences as a technical solution to this problem. Fences provide a 
spatial means of controlling human-elephant interactions by creating a place for 
elephants and a place for cultivation. They are often planned and designed based on 
the ecology of the target species.  Yet as we show in this case study, behind their 
technical façade, fences are highly political. This article presents the process of 
planning and building the 121km West Laikipia Fence: created to prevent elephants 
from moving out of large private and government-owned ranches and onto 
smallholder cultivated land to the west of Laikipia County. We seek to show how the 
construction of a fence to solve the problem of HEC led to the division, reinforcement 
and communication of territory on the ground and how this was captured and shaped 
by different, and sometimes conflicting, political interests. 
 
Keywords: Elephant, human-elephant conflict, conservation, fences, boundaries, 
Kenya. 
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1. Introduction   
Conservation is fundamentally a spatial practice (Adams et al., 2014), based, as it is, 
on the conceptual separation of human and non-human, and the protection of one 
against the other.  The establishment of protected areas has been the leading strategy 
of conservation since the end of the nineteenth century (Adams, 2004; Sheail, 2010).  
In colonial Africa, conservation policy constituted a new order for nature and human 
society, as the colonial state sought to separate animals and people.  Protected areas 
were the cornerstone of that strategy, firstly in the form of game reserves, and latterly 
(especially after World War Two), in the form of national parks. An Anglo-American 
nature aesthetic drove a vision of nature as wilderness, and the creation of protected 
areas as islands of the wild in a peopled landscape (Neumann, 2004).  Thus the Selous 
Game Reserve was carved out of Liwale District in colonial Tanzania in the 1930s, 
abandoned to its elephants, while people were moved out  (Neumann, 2001).  The 
story of displacement and dispossession has become a standard of critical political 
ecology (Brockington, 2002; Brockington et al., 2008; Kelly, 2015), with Africa as 
one of its prime exemplars (Neumann, 2002; Garland, 2008).   
 
The conceptual and practical placing of nature within specific spatial bounds can be 
thought of in terms of the creation of conservation territories (Peters, 1994; Hughes, 
2005).  Elden (2010: 810) described territory as an object of governance: ‘a rendering 
of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, 
mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled’.  The creation of territorialization is a 
process reflecting the exercise of power, and the control of space, people and nature.  
Kelly (2015) identified protected areas as ‘internal territories’, areas set aside within 
national boundaries where nature, and the use of nature by people, are controlled.  
 
Sack (1986: 32) noted that territory is easy to demarcate since in principle it requires 
only one kind of a marker or sign: the boundary. Territorialization can be defined as 
the process by which institutions attempt to control actions by drawing boundaries 
around a geographic space, excluding some categories of individuals from this space, 
and prescribing specific activities within these boundaries (Vandergeest, 1996).  The 
key element in conservation territorialization is the demarcation and enforcement of 
boundaries, and these boundaries are the spatial focus of legal and coercive action in 
support of conservation outcomes (Peluso, 1993).   
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There is a rich scholarly literature on the politics of boundary making. Jones (1945) 
described four stages of boundary making: the allocation of territory; delimitation 
(choosing the alignment); demarcation (the physical marking on the ground); and 
administration (perpetuation of the physical boundary).  Within political geography, 
boundaries have typically been analysed at the scale of the state, as the most explicit 
manifestation of the large-scale connections between politics and geography  
(Newman and Paasi, 1998).  However, the creation of boundaries at finer scales also 
generates significant political processes. Newman (2006: 148) suggests that the 
alignment of borders is ‘normally determined by political and social élites as part of 
the process of societal ordering and compartmentalisation’.  Although a boundary 
may appear to be a clearly defined line, it is often an outcome of a complex, contested 
negotiation between different actors (Häkli, 2008). The process of physically 
demarcating a boundary is the ‘crux of all boundary making’ (Holdich, 1916: 208): ‘it 
is in this process that disputes usually arise, and weak elements in the [plan] are apt to 
be discovered’.  
 
Barriers are the physical realisation of boundaries and take many forms: most 
conspicuously fences and walls  (Spierenburg and Wels 2006).  However they 
universally function as both physical markers and as symbolic icons that convey 
particular political meanings in the social landscapes in which they exist (Peters, 
1994; Suzuki, 2001).  They help to institutionalise the collective recognition of 
property rights and fix control over land use (Kotchemidova, 2008).  They are a 
spatial projection of power that transforms not only the relations between nature and 
society but also social relations within a landscape (Van Sittert, 2002) in which 
‘people negotiate the meanings of land, resources and property’ (Sheridan, 2008: 
154). Boundaries and associated barriers reflect the nature of power relations between 
actors and the ability of a group to determine and impose categories of inclusion and 
exclusion (Ganster and Lorey, 2005; Newman, 2006).   Geopolitically, walls have 
been signatures of territorial reconfigurations (Waterman, 1994; Thomas 1999; 
Daniel, 2000; Griggs, 2000; Brawer, 2002) and are increasingly being built along 
national boundaries to define migration policies (Loyd et al. 2013).  Furthermore, 
fence materials themselves have shaped sociopolitical landscapes. The invention of 
barbed wire, for example, in 1873 transformed the American West, as settlers 
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demarcated their patch of land in the frontier with an aggressive physical and 
symbolic statement to ‘intruders’ (Peffer, 1951). As Krell (2002: 160) notes, ‘barbed 
wire has always functioned in that paradoxical zone, between protection and 
division’.   Alongside the wiring of the American West, Razac (2002) notes that 
barbed wire embodies two other heavy memories: the trenches of World War I; and 
the concentration camps of World War II.   
 
In conservation, fenced boundaries define conservation territories, strengthening the 
fortress approach by physically actualising the nature-society divide (Brockington, 
2002). Fences for conservation purposes tend to be planned and built to separate 
nature from threatening human activity (Hayward and Kerley, 2009), invasive species 
(e.g. Brook et al., 2004), disease (e.g. Sutmoller, 2002) or persecution resulting from 
conflict or the illegal killing of wildlife (e.g. Packer et al., 2013). Protected area 
boundaries are often fenced to exclude local people (redefining human movement 
onto protected land as trespassing, the collection of fuel wood, cattle fodder or food as 
theft; hunting for meat as poaching; and making a home as encroachment, Homewood 
and Rodgers 1991; Spierenburg and Wels, 2006; Brockington et al., 2006; Duffy, 
2000; Büscher, 2010). At the same time, such fences typically permit entry for certain 
categories of people (e.g. tourists).   
 
Conservation fences may be planned for technical reasons, but their construction is 
highly political. Wels (2000) describes how the white shareholders of Save Valley 
Conservancy in Zimbabwe wished to generate revenue to invest into its neighbouring 
communities through a hunting tourism operation.  To do so, it was a legal 
requirement to build a veterinary fence to keep buffalo off neighboring farmland. To 
white conservancy shareholders the fence represented a necessary means to generate 
benefits that could flow over their boundary. However for surrounding smallholder 
farmers the fence represented an ‘insurmountable physical and symbolic obstacle, 
because it puts the disputed signature of the white owner and its social identity on the 
land’ (Wels, 2000: xxi). In the Karoo region of South Africa, the enclosure of the 
open semi-arid landscape with fences from the late 19th Century – to define private 
ranches and later, conservation areas, and exclude trespassers – constrained the 
mobility and resilience of people and wildlife (Sheridan, 2008; Roche, 2008; Rohde 
and Hoffman, 2008; Benjaminsen et al., 2008). Today, these hardened fenced 
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boundaries persist, supported by the narratives of powerful conservationist actors 
about land degradation, and contribute to the insecurity of rights and livelihoods of 
the poor (Benjaminsen et al., 2008).   
 
In the context of fenced conservation boundaries, patterns of exclusion and inclusion 
also extend to animals, both domestic and wild.  Furthermore the expansion of human 
settlement and cultivation onto elephant range has been viewed as a political, 
colonial-like act of appropriation and a breach on the sovereignty of wildlife 
communities (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). In Etosha National Park, Namibia, 
dogs had been used for herding by Herero pastoralists for centuries. Yet when the 
Park was established and its boundaries drawn and enforced, dogs that crossed into 
the Park were shot as a threat to wildlife (Hoole and Berkes, 2010).  Likewise, 
conservation boundaries determine what wild animals can do.  Wild animals may 
roam at will within protected areas, designated as ‘wildlife’, to be protected, 
photographed or researched.  Yet once those same animals cross a protected area 
boundary and intrude on landscapes designated for people, they are re-classified as 
marauding, dangerous pests (Wels, 2000).  
 
The result is ‘human-wildlife conflict’, a widely used term for negative interactions 
between people and wild animals, albeit one that conflates the impacts of wildlife on 
people and their activities, and associated conflicts between conservationists and other 
people about these impacts (Redpath et al., 2015). Human-wildlife conflict is a 
problem throughout Africa, not only around protected areas from which animals issue 
forth and raid farmers’ crops, but also where wild animals and people share 
unprotected land.  Many animals raid crops (primates, bush-pigs and rodents, for 
example), but the most intractable crop-raiding problems in Africa are associated with 
the African elephant, Loxodonta africana. Human-elephant conflict (HEC) is 
recognised to be a serious problem across African elephant range, particularly along 
the hard boundaries that separate cultivation from wildlife areas (Graham et al., 2009; 
Hoare, 2012).  HEC encompasses the range of negative interactions that occur 
between people and elephants sharing a landscape and includes significant damage to 
crops, property, livestock risk to human life and the retaliatory killings of elephants 
(Barua, 2010; Graham et al., 2012). Elephants have a vast requirement for space and 
resources (Blake et al., 2003; Leggett, 2006), and although elephant numbers have 
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declined since the latest poaching crisis began in 2011 (Nelleman et al., 2013; White, 
2014), human settlement and the expansion of smallholder cultivation on rangeland 
used by elephants have created conditions for conflict in many countries.    
 
HEC is among the most emotive and political form of human-wildlife conflict (Lee 
and Graham, 2006). Elephants embody diverse cultural contradictions: they are a 
serious and sometimes dangerous crop pest and are locally feared, whilst 
internationally they have an iconic status, are widely revered or even loved, and in 
conservation terms are regarded as threatened, and are protected (Lorimer, 2010; 
Barua, 2013).  HEC can illicit violent responses from people. Mariki et al. (2015), for 
example, found that the killing of six elephants in northern Tanzania was not driven 
by retribution to crop or property damage alone but by a wider, underlying resistance 
to the appropriation of land for conservation that has marginalised and disempowered 
local people. 
 
The importance attached to elephants, and their destructive power, puts a political 
premium on reducing HEC in elephant range countries Africa.  Experiments have 
been made with ‘community-based’, reactive HEC-mitigation measures such as chili 
fences, watchtowers, lights, noise-generation and bees.  All have proved to be 
ineffective at deterring elephants at a large scale due to the labour and technical skills 
required  (Sitati and Walpole, 2006; Graham and Ochieng, 2008; Hoare, 2012). The 
attempt of government wildlife managers, to address conflict is hampered by limited 
resources, and the fact that crop-raiding is intermittent, difficult to predict and 
widespread in space (Graham et al., 2010). Delayed response to raids and the problem 
of finding the animals concerned (leading to the wrong animals being targeted) is both 
unsatisfactory and ineffective (Hoare, 2012).   
 
The failure of deterrence methods in reducing crop-raiding has led to increasing 
investment in electrified fences to manage the problematic relationship between 
farmers and elephants. In Kenya, for example, the Kenya Wildlife Service estimates 
that a total of 1245km of electrified fencing currently stands in Kenya with an 
additional 1000km under the process of construction (KWS, 2014). Electrified fences 
are an attempt to create hard boundaries that control human-elephant interactions and 
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designate separate spaces for elephants and for farmers.  
 
Despite their stated technical and ecological purpose, elephant fences are inherently 
political. HEC reflects and generates complex political interactions – between 
conservation agencies and farmers and between different land users, over rights to use 
land and the right to protection from crop-raiding.   Fences, offered as a technical 
solution to this problem, serve to hide the politics of elephant crop-raiding and of 
access to land. The depoliticisation of policy interventions through the deployment of 
technical narratives has a long history in development.  Ferguson describes how with 
the flick of a switch, the anti-politics machine depoliticises ‘everything it touches, 
everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost 
unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation’ (Ferguson, 1990: xv). In her 
analysis of a conservation and development intervention in Indonesia, Li (2007: 126) 
describes how boundaries were inscribed and social-political processes rationalised in 
technical terms; in this process of ‘rendering technical’, project implementers 
‘highlighted only those problems for which a technical solution could be proposed’.  
Anti-politics is inherent to science-based policy interventions, aspiring to provide 
technical solutions to problems that are fundamentally political.  Büscher (2010: 48) 
contends that anti-politics is a necessary political strategy for those implementing the 
conservation intervention to ‘make things happen’.  
 
In this paper, we analyse the politics behind the anti-political process of conservation 
boundary-making through the construction of elephant fences.  We focus on the 
process of planning and constructing a 121km electrified fence in Laikipia County, 
central Kenya, along the border of large cattle ranches to stop crop-raiding by 
elephants on neighbouring smallholder land.  The stated intention of the West 
Laikipia Fence was to separate elephants from cultivation.  We explore the politics 
behind its construction, especially the way in which its construction furthered the 
underlying political interests of different stakeholders.  We seek to show that the 
fence that was built was the outcome of complex political negotiation and conflict 
between stakeholders.  In particular, we consider the way the fence served to define, 
communicate and reinforce territory in a way that helped secure the land tenure of 
powerful actors.   
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2. Study area 
Laikipia comprises a 9,800km2 plateau and one county located on the equator 
between Mount Kenya, the Aberdare Mountains and the Rift Valley in north-central 
Kenya (Figure 1).  Rainfall is typically bimodal seasonally, but is unpredictable and 
may fall at any time of year. However rainfall declines from 800mm per annum in the 
south to just 300 mm in the north (Berger, 1989). Laikipia has no formally protected 
wildlife areas, but contains the second highest abundance of wildlife in Kenya, after 
Maasai Mara National Reserve (Kinnaird and O’Brien, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Location of Laikipia County within Kenya 
 
Ownership of and access to land in Laikipia has been punctuated by waves of 
exclusion and inclusion.  The first of these involved the two Anglo-Maasai Treaties in 
1904 and 1911.  Under the first, the colonial government moved Maasai people into 
Laikipia from the Central Rift Valley to form the Maasai Northern Reserve.  Under 
the second, in 1911, they evicted them to allow European Settlement, causing the 
death of many people and cattle (Hughes, 2006; 2007).  The British government 
wanted to create an export-orientated free market economy in the British East African 
Protectorate (Pestalozzi, 1986) and in pursuit of this set the highlands of Kenya 
(dubbed ‘The White Highlands’) aside for European settlement. The eviction of 
pastoralists from Laikipia in 1911 reflected the colonial government’s view of 
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pastoralism as irrational, uneconomic and based on accumulation for its own sake 
(Kenya Land Commission, 1933). 
 
Once cleared, Laikipia was swiftly subdivided into large land units for European 
settlers.  Large ranches over 10,000 acres were thought to be needed for profitable 
cattle production (Vaughan, 2005). European settlement had dramatic social impacts 
on Laikipia (Wambuguh, 2007). It created a small, powerful, European elite that was 
responsible for the management of almost all land in Laikipia. 
 
After Kenyan independence in 1963, some settler families retained their properties, 
but many Europeans sold up and left the country.  Some former settler land in 
Laikipia was bought, both under government schemes and by private land buying 
syndicates, and subdivided into 1.2–5 acre plots for settlement, mostly by Kikuyu 
smallholders from Central Kenya (Kohler, 1987; Thouless, 1994). Initially, such 
settlement was planned in the light of land suitability, but over time the political aim 
of settling as many landless people as possible and the demand for land for economic 
security and to profit from land sales, became dominant drivers of land exchange 
(Huber and Oponde, 1995).  As a result, properties in more arid areas were purchased 
and subdivided (Graham, 2007), and the size and cultivation potential of plots 
distributed among shareholders declined over time.  Many plots were abandoned or 
never settled at all (Kohler, 1987) because they were too dry for rain fed agriculture 
and lacked a water source for irrigation, or because of legal disputes with land buying 
companies. 
 
Under the Land (Group Representatives) Act of 1968, the Kenyan government also 
established group ranches in order to encourage pastoralists to settle, commercialise, 
conserve rangeland and invest in infrastructure (Grandin, 1967).  Many group ranches 
in Kenya failed in these objectives due to their insufficient size and pasture, elite 
capture and governance issues (Herren, 1991) Eleven group ranches were established 
in Laikipia. 
 
Laikipia today therefore comprises a mosaic of different land uses and tenure shaped 
by colonial and post-colonial land policies.   Large commercial cattle ranches cover 
39 per cent of the County, smallholder plots cover 34%, government owned land 
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8.5% (one ranch, veterinary outspans, land bought by the government settlement trust 
fund and swamps), group ranches 7%, forest reserves 7%, and urban areas 4.5% 
(LWF, 2012). The result is a spatially chaotic juxtaposition of various kinds of large 
land units with populations of wildlife, and scattered smallholder farms. This has 
made Laikipia particularly vulnerable to crop-raiding by elephants.  
 
Stakeholders in the Laikipia landscape have very different interests in relation to land 
and elephants, and different powers to pursue them. Responsibility to protect wildlife, 
and to protect of citizens and private property against wildlife, lies with the parastatal 
Kenya Wildlife Service. Conservation NGOs seek to secure the place of elephants in 
the Laikipia landscape.  The owners of large-scale ranches mostly tolerate elephants, 
and indeed many have developed wildlife tourism enterprises as they diversified their 
business models (Thouless, 1994; LWF, 2012). Smallholder farmers fear crop-raiding 
and want elephants to be excluded from their land and their crops, or removed 
altogether. Pastoralists tend to have a more tolerant relationship with elephants (Gadd, 
2005; Graham 2007), and have long sought access to grass for their livestock across 
Laikipia’s mosaic of land tenure. 
 
The use of land in Laikipia by elephants has also changed over time. Colonial and 
post-colonial records suggest that elephants were rare in Laikipia at the end of the 
nineteenth century, presumably as a result of over-hunting for ivory by coastal trading 
caravans (Neumann, 1898). Records start to increase in the 1970s, probably because 
of the rise of intense poaching to the north in Samburu in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
is believed to have driven elephants into Laikipia (Thouless, 1992). By the 1990s, 
elephants were common on ranchland in Laikipia. 
 
Although Laikipia contains no formally protected areas, ranch land provides over 
3,600 km2 of undeveloped habitat where human population densities are very low 
(1/km2). The dense vegetation and provision of water from livestock dams within 
ranches provides good habitat for an estimated 6,400 elephants (Ngene et al., 2013). 
Ranches also provide a daytime refuge from which elephants can move at night to 
raid smallholder crops (Graham et al., 2009).  Elephants are the largest, widest 
ranging and most destructive species in Laikipia.  Crop-raiding had become a 
politically prominent wildlife issue by the early 80s, arousing hostility to both 
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elephants and those managing them (Jenkins and Hamilton, 1982).  By the early 
decades of the twentieth century, Laikipia had amongst the highest numbers of HEC 
incidents in East Africa (Graham et al., 2010).  
 
As crop-raiding by elephants increased on smallholder farms, intolerance of elephants 
grew among smallholder farmers. Elephants were increasingly seen by smallholders 
to ‘belong’ to ranches since they benefitted from the presence of elephants through 
tourism (Thouless, 1994), and ranchers faced mounting political pressure to keep 
elephants off their smallholder neighbours’ land. Both smallholders and the 
politicians who represented them began to view electrified fencing as an obligation of 
large-scale ranchers. In 1982, the Wildlife and Conservation Management Department 
proposed a single fence across Laikipia to prevent elephants from moving from 
‘wildlife-tolerant’ large-scale ranches in the low rainfall area to the east and north, 
onto the wetter area of smallholder cultivation in the south and west (Jenkins and 
Hamilton, 1982).  However, without funding to support construction costs, and in the 
absence of consensus from all ranchers, this fence was not built.  Instead, electrified 
fences were only built by better-endowed ranches to stop elephants raiding (Thouless 
and Sakwa, 1995).  Other ranchers did not fence their properties, because of a low 
presence of elephants (or an active policy of deterring them), because of cost or 
because they believed that the Laikipia landscape should be contiguous wildlife 
habitat, not sub-divided by fences. 
 
In 2002, the idea of a Laikipia-wide fence was resurrected.  Thouless et al. (2002) 
developed a fencing strategy for Laikipia under the Laikipia Wildlife Forum that 
followed Jenkins and Hamilton’s (1982) proposed line.  However, to avoid problems 
of ownership and maintenance of a single fence, the strategy advocated a ‘modular 
approach, which would support the construction of individual fences that fitted within 
an overall framework’ (Thouless et al., 2002: 3). By 2007, contiguous sections of 
electrified fence had been constructed along the perimeter of ten different properties 
on Laikipia (Figure 2), but there was a large gap to the west.   The fence that was 
constructed to close this gap – the West Laikipia Fence – is the focus of this paper. 
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Figure 2.  Elephant fences in Laikipia in 2007 
 
3. Methods 
This paper draws on fieldwork that was carried out between January-December 2012.  
As part of a wider social-ecological study, the first author conducted in-depth 
interviews with a range of stakeholders of the West Laikipia Fence project.  Grimble 
and Wellard (1997) define stakeholders as any person or group, organised or 
unorganised, with an interest or stake in an issue or system. We identified the 
stakeholders as those organisations and individuals involved in planning and 
construction of the West Laikipia Fence, as follows: 1) local political leaders at the 
county level and in the seven sub-locations through which the West Laikipia Fence 
passed (the administrative structure of the Government of Kenya divides counties into 
locations and sub-locations, which are headed by a location chief and a sub-location 
chief elected by county government officials); 2) conservation organisations working 
in Laikipia: the Laikipia Wildlife Forum and Kenya Wildlife Service; 3) owners or 
managers of ranches (hereafter called ‘ranchers’) that bordered the West Laikipia 
Fence and ranchers elsewhere in Laikipia who had experience of electrified elephant 
fences; 4) smallholder farmers who lived and/or farmed within 3km of the fence (this 
distance was selected on the basis of a GIS analysis of the distance between GPS 
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locations of five collared elephants throughout 2010 and 2011, that determined the 
mean distance moved by an elephant crop-raiding was 2.6km into smallholder land 
from the fence – Evans 2014); 5)  pastoralists who lived and grazed within 3km of the 
fence.  
 
In the case of political leaders, conservationists and ranch managers (stakeholder 
groups 1-3), all individuals or representatives of relevant organisations were 
interviewed. In some cases more than one individual was interviewed in an 
organisation if the first interviewee suggested that they would have further insights.  
In the case of smallholder farmers and pastoralists (stakeholder groups 4 and 5), 
snowball sampling was used to choose interviewees. The first individuals interviewed 
were purposively selected from existing knowledge of the fence and the area (Evans, 
2014), and asked to suggest other people who had been involved in consultations 
regarding the planning and building of the West Laikipia Fence.   
 
We started the interviews by informing the participants about the research. Interviews 
were informal and conversational in style and loosely guided by a list of topics for 
discussion, specific for each stakeholder group.  In total, we conducted in-depth 
interviews with 63 individuals.  Interviews were carried out in either English by the 
first author or in Kiswahili or Maa and translated verbally to the first author. We used 
a combination of recording and note-taking. We also held seven focus group 
discussions in each sub-location along the West Laikipia Fence to understand the 
history of community engagement with the fence. Additionally, we carried out 
interviews with key informants who were chosen based on their knowledge and 
ability to contribute insightful information on the use of fencing to deter elephants.  
Finally, we reviewed relevant grey literature and other studies.  We transcribed 
interviews soon after they finished.  We coded transcripts with an initial descriptive 
coding system of surface-level messages, and then a pattern coding system to reveal 
patterns and perceptions (Hoggart et al., 2002).  Respondents were kept anonymous, 
and are identified in this paper by a number. 
 
4. Conception 
4.1. An apolitical fence 
In early 2006, the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (hereafter ‘the LWF’) developed a 
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proposal	   for an electrified fence to be built along ranch boundaries in western 
Laikipia. The LWF had been established in 1992 under the leadership of a ranch 
owner who was a direct descendent of a former white landowner. He saw the forum 
as an institution ‘to build bridges between ranchers and their neighbours’ (Interview 
no.28, February 2012). From its inception, the LWF was a membership organisation, 
in which any individual or institution could join for a varying fee. The LWF’s 
membership was diverse and included ranchers, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, 
group ranches, natural resource user groups, schools, conservation and development 
NGOs. The LWF had ambitious conservation goals, in that it sought to represent the 
interests of its entire membership, although as we discuss, these interests were often 
in conflict. 
 
A win-win narrative dominated the LWF’s proposal. On one hand, the fence would 
‘safeguard the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in the west...through increased food 
security and reduced livestock theft’ (LWF, 2006: 8). On the other hand, it would 
protect biodiversity – particularly elephants – by reducing the number of ‘elephants 
killed due to human-wildlife conflict’. Furthermore it would ‘support biodiversity 
related livelihoods’ – specifically tourism – as well as improving attitudes towards 
wildlife and consolidating conservation efforts in Laikipia (ibid). Beyond the direct 
impacts, the proposal also claimed that the fence would reduce ‘unsustainable 
resource use practices’ because, human-wildlife conflict is known to force ‘people to 
poison elephants and into activities such as charcoal production and bush meat 
trade...and poaching’ (LWF, 2006: 2). 
 
McShane et al. (2011) describe how win-win language about the simultaneous 
achievement of positive conservation and development has come to dominate the 
external and internal discourse in conservation organisations. Community-based 
conservation was born out of this win-win approach, on the basis that local people are 
more likely to support conservation if they have stake in its management, that 
excluding them from the decision making process is an infringement of their human 
rights, that they have traditional governance systems for natural resources and that the 
costs of conservation are directly offset (Adams and Hulme, 2001; Baker, 2004; 
Brockington et al., 2006).  Despite their frequent failure to achieve conservation and 
development objectives (Barrett and Arcese, 1995; Songorwa et al., 2000; Wells and 
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McShane, 2004) win–win narratives of conservation continue to dominate the sector.  
McShane et al. (2011) note that such approaches have the appearance of being ethical, 
efficient, and highly marketable and are therefore appealing to donors.  Furthermore 
the win-win paradigm avoids the ‘potentially divisive political requirements of 
understanding and confronting explicit trade-offs between competing stakeholders’ 
(Wells and McShane, 2004; McShane et al. 2011: 969; Salafsky, 2011). 
 
The LWF funding proposal framed the West Laikipia Fence as a technical issue, lying 
completely outside the realm of politics. The complexity of the social landscape and 
politics that underpinned access to land was reduced to a simple and ostensibly 
‘technical’ solution:  an exercise in anti-politics (Ferguson, 1990; Büscher, 2010).  
Apolitical rhetoric, like win-win language, had a powerful function in Laikipia: to 
ensure and justify support and resources from donors.  The LWF and the MP were 
highly effective at raising funds.  Within a year they raised nearly 65 million Kenyan 
Shillings (US$ 970,000) from the Dutch Government, the Government of Kenya 
(through the Kenyan Wildlife Service, and Constituency Development Fund), and 
from the International Fund for Animal Welfare. The proposal, as well as appealing to 
donors, also served to fulfill their organisational aim of appealing to much of their 
membership. HEC represented a ‘significant diplomatic challenge’ for the LWF 
(Interview no. 21, September 2012) in that a large component of their membership 
were angry and frustrated by elephants destroying their crops, while another 
component were trying to conserve elephants, and another component owned most of 
the elephant habitat within ranches.   
 
4.2. A political fence 
Even though the funding proposal for the West Laikipia Fence sought to be apolitical, 
the issue of HEC and of fencing as a solution to it was already highly charged 
politically.   In the run up to the 2007 Kenyan elections, HEC had become a 
prominent and politicised campaigning topic in Laikipia. Mounting intolerance 
towards elephants amongst smallholders led aspiring politicians to rally the support of 
their smallholder constituents with promises of solving the problems they faced in 
sharing a landscape with elephants. The reduction of crop-raiding was an integral 
component of the campaign run by the incumbent Member of Parliament (MP) for 
Laikipia West Constituency who was seeking to hold his seat in the upcoming 
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election at the end of 2007.  The MP had been a prominent leader behind the 
‘Africanisation’ of Kenya after independence. He helped to establish many of the 
land-buying companies for Kikuyu smallholder from central Kenya in western 
Laikipia and had himself bought a 22,000-acre ranch in western Laikipia.  
 
The MP was also a major proponent of wildlife governance reform in Kenya. He 
developed and lobbied for a Wildlife Bill in 2004 that attempted to decentralise 
Kenya’s wildlife governance, which the President did not pass (Kabiri, 2010).  The 
MP’s political interest in wildlife in his constituency meant that he was closely 
involved with the work of the LWF. The MP had worked closely with the Director of 
the LWF (who served from 2009-2012) in developing, attempting to lobby his 
wildlife bill through parliament in 2004. 
 
The opportunity to close the gap in the Laikipia-wide fence to finally solve HEC was 
an attractive prospect for the MP’s re-election campaign in 2007.  Leading the fencing 
of western Laikipia’s ranches appealed strongly to his smallholder farmer 
constituency, who were suffering from persistent crop-raiding by elephants leaving 
the ranches.  It also helped secure the position of their large ranch neighbours, of 
which he was one, by promising to remove the nuisance of crop raids. Sitting on a 
ranch house veranda in September 2005, the MP asked the ranchers and the LWF 
whether they could help him to complete the trans-Laikipia fence. The LWF Director 
saw the MP’s political backing as an opportunity to secure funding for a large-scale 
conservation project: one that provided a simple, technical, solution to the complex 
problem of HEC in Laikipia.  Furthermore it was a high-profile and politically 
supported solution. Additionally, for the LWF Director, the fence also represented his 
own beliefs about the relationship between people and wildlife: 
‘The reason why most Kenyans are ambivalent or loathe wildlife is because 
the relationship they have with wildlife is a direct one. If you don’t desire a 
direct relationship with wildlife and if you can stop having a direct 
relationship with wildlife, your attitude towards wildlife will change.’ 
(Interview no. 22, September 2012) 
The MP wanted the fence built quickly. In February 2006, he and the LWF set up a 
committee to provide technical advice on the building of the fence, comprised of the 
MP, the LWF, the Kenya Wildlife Service, local politicians and ranch owners. He 
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also engaged the media. An article published in the Daily Nation newspaper laid out 
his political past and future intentions, entitled ‘[MP] proposes 50 million KES fence 
to keep out elephants’ (Daily Nation, 2006). In it, the MP was quoted as saying, 
‘destruction of crops and loss of lives by wild animals would have been curbed by the 
Wildlife Bill which the President declined to assent to. We have no choice but to erect 
a fence’ (Daily Nation, 2006: 6). The LWF Director recalled the ‘persistent pressure’ 
placed on him by the MP in the form of weekly phone calls to speed up the process of 
funding and building the West Laikipia Fence: ‘Coming from an elder of the political 
establishment of Kenya, you pay attention.’ (Interview no. 22, September 2012).  
Even before the West Laikipia Fence was built, it served the purposes of two 
significant stakeholders: by promising to reduce HEC, it forwarded a political 
campaign and it helped a conservation organisation to achieve its goals. 
 
5. Planning the fence 
5.1. Consultation 
The LWF’s proposal simplified the social complexity of Laikipia.  It focused the 
West Laikipia Fence on a target society: the ‘stakeholders and beneficiaries’ were the 
smallholder farmers living ‘in close proximity’ to the fence (LWF, 2006: 8). Ferguson 
(1990: 83) described how, in the concept of a development intervention in Lesotho, 
‘the centrality of agriculture in the local economy was the unquestioned premise of 
the entire project’ despite migrant wage labour being the most important source of 
income for the majority of the population. Similarly, the local economy promoted by 
the West Laikipia Fence proposal was framed wholly around cultivation, since 
smallholders were the stakeholders whose livelihoods were suffering from frequent 
elephant crop-raiding.  However, as outlined below, people for whom pastoralism was 
the dominant mode of household production comprised a significant part of Laikipia’s 
society. 
 
Kikuyu smallholder farmers are politically significant actors within Laikipia. Most 
own their land and depend on it for their livelihoods; they are vulnerable to attack by 
elephants.  Through his campaign for the fence, the MP was contributing to securing 
their tenure of land, their livelihoods, and also their votes.  However, smallholder 
farmers were not the only people living outside the ranches on Laikipia. Different 
pastoralist groups have used Laikipia for centuries (Lane, 2010; Watson, 2014), and 
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were widely distributed across the area. Research carried out in the mid-2000s had 
flagged the increasing importance of Laikipia’s unoccupied sub-divided smallholder 
land to pastoralists (Lane, 2005; Gadd, 2005; Graham, 2007). Yet the LWF proposal 
only referred to pastoralists indirectly, in terms of their significance to elephants. 
They were framed as broadly tolerant of wildlife: stable wildlife numbers in the dry 
north and east of Laikipia were attributed to ‘attitudes towards wildlife amongst 
pastoralist communities’ (LWF, 2006: 4).  Pastoralists’ use of land was not 
considered central to the proposed fence.  Although the LWF’s fencing strategy had 
warned that pastoralists have undermined other electrified fences in Laikipia 
(Thouless et al., 2002), the proposal stated that ‘the fence structure itself ... will not 
impinge on the movements of people or livestock’ (LWF, 2006: 6). Moreover it 
claimed that the fence would have an additional positive social impact on 
smallholders’ security by ‘controlling livestock movements through agreed access 
ways and so livestock theft will be reduced’ (ibid).  
 
By presenting a simplified account of land use in Laikipia, centred on smallholder 
cultivation, the narrative to donors was clear, and a distinct smallholder territory was 
defined.  A fence would create an elephant territory in eastern Laikipia, and ensure 
that elephants no longer strayed onto newly demarcated smallholder territory in 
western Laikipia. This narrative strengthened and simplified the LWF’s conservation 
narrative on their objective of finding a permanent solution to HEC.   
 
In July 2006 the LWF began an ‘extensive process of stakeholder consultation’ to 
‘ensure that the fence had buy-in and support from the stakeholders living by it’ and 
to ‘discuss the implications of the fence and what the costs were in terms of 
maintenance and lost opportunities’ (Interview no. 25, October 2012). The LWF held 
a series of public meetings within each of the seven sub-locations through which the 
proposed fence would pass through, to which the chief of each sub-location invited 
hundreds of smallholders and resident pastoralists. Pastoralists were reported to have 
raised no concerns about the fence: ‘They wanted in, they were in agreement’ 
(Interview no. 25, October 2012). In each sub-location chiefs and community leaders 
were almost wholly smallholders. Inevitably smallholder voices and concerns 
dominated the meetings.  The LWF established four ‘fence committees’ at the 
meetings by voting for membership through a show of hands.  The committees were 
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comprised entirely of smallholders living next to the proposed fence. Each committee 
signed letters declaring their unanimous and ongoing support of the fence.  
 
Despite this seemingly unanimous support, the LWF Director accepted in retrospect 
that the impacts of the fence on pastoralists were not properly addressed at this stage: 
‘There was a whole section of society we did not pick up on. That was the 
people who this fence was extremely inconvenient to and undesirable for, 
because it prevented them from accessing grazing. For some reason that was 
not apparent at the onset.’ (Interview no. 22, September 2012) 
The reason pastoralists did not object to the fence in the consultation meetings was 
primarily because the activity that the fence would inhibit – grazing on privately 
owned ranch and smallholder– was illegal: ‘Of course they didn’t want to speak out 
about it in public.’ (Interview no. 25, October 2012) 
 
Pastoralists have formal communal tenure in just seven per cent of Laikipia County, 
within 11 group ranches (LWF, 2012): none of this land in the central or well-watered 
southern parts of the plateau.  Pastoral groups regularly grazed stock on land further 
south legally held but not occupied by smallholders.  Unlike smallholders and ranch 
owners, most pastoralists did not have rights to land on Laikipia, despite the historical 
importance of the plateau for seasonal grazing.  Since colonial times, pastoralist 
access to the land in Laikipia had been marked by exclusion, and their use of land 
almost everywhere was uncertain and extra-legal.  
 
By 2000, de-facto informal use of land by pastoralists was widespread. Pastoralists 
habitually obtained illegal access to pasture within large-scale ranches, either using 
unguarded land, or by arriving and negotiating access when challenged. The LWF 
(2012) estimated that of Laikipia’s 9,800km2, pastoralists utilised 3,500km2 
informally or illegally and were granted access to a further 2,000km2 on certain 
ranches under managed grazing regimes.  Ranch owners vehemently resisted illegal 
grazing on their ranches.  To them, an ‘elephant fence’ provided a valuable tool 
against illegal grazing. Land abandoned or unoccupied by smallholders left a vacuum 
in a mosaic of otherwise privately owned land, which allowed pastoralists from 
outside Laikipia (Samburu, Baringo and Turkana) to graze cattle and take up 
residence.  After 2007 there was an influx of Samburu pastoralists settling south and 
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west of the Laikipia Fence, due to inter-ethnic conflict with Pokot pastoralists over 
access to grazing further north 2007-2010, to lack of pasture due to the 2009 drought, 
and to the grazing opportunities that Laikipia presented (Evans, 2014).  Some of these 
households had bought small plots of land from the local administration over this 
time, in order to legitimise their presence. 
 
Pastoralist immigration into Laikipia is a process that has long been resisted by 
Kikuyu smallholder farmers. Thus, along the length of the West Laikipia Fence 
smallholders complained (during fieldwork of 2012) of pastoralists either grazing on 
their farmed land or competing for pasture on nearby unoccupied land. One 
smallholder commented:  
‘Every day you wake up and another manyatta has popped up in front of your 
house... If one Samburu settles on a small plot, the next day many of their 
friends and family will then come there to graze their cows. A home of one 
family soon becomes the home of 25 people with all of their cattle. Soon there 
is no grass left for anyone else’s livestock.’ (Interview no. 6, November 2012)  
Furthermore, pastoralists with origins outside of Laikipia were blamed for violent 
armed insecurity in the area: ‘These people have guns and come here and steal our 
livestock’ (Interview no. 60, November 2012). 
 
The dominant idea of land rights recognised by smallholders on Laikipia (and 
favoured by the Government of Kenya) centered on individualised freehold 
ownership.  This system contrasted with the traditional communal approach to land of 
pastoralists. Moreover, land rights were seen to underpin political representation.  
Sub-location chiefs in western Laikipia (all smallholders) recognised their 
communities through tenure. As one chief said: ‘We don’t involve the pastoralist 
people if they are not residents from this area.’ (Interview no. 12, October 2012)  
Land purchase changed the political status of pastoralists: if a Samburu or Maasai 
household bought land ‘then they would be part of this community’ (Interview no. 12, 
October 2012). Some conservancies in Laikipia had a similar approach to managing 
their relationships with their pastoralist neighbours. One conservancy manager 
described how they only invested in communities holding land through title deeds: ‘A 
lot of these people live on land that doesn’t belong to them, so by dealing with them 
you are actually condoning their illegal use of land.’ (Interview no. 38, November 
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2012) 
 
The issue of pastoralists using and settling on unoccupied sub-divided former ranch 
land was contentious.  The LWF Director noted that, in Laikipia, in the context of 
Kikuyu smallholders and Samburu pastoralists, ‘We had one ethnic group owning all 
the land and another group occupying the land.’ (Interview no. 22, September 2012)  
In the lead up to the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya (in which over one 
thousand people were killed), he noted that ‘we had a country already split along 
ethnic lines politically, so people don’t want to go near those politics and people are 
scared to go near it’ (ibid).  Responses to inter-ethnic conflict therefore were ‘all 
smoke and mirrors. We are professionally inadequate to deal with these situations 
where there are some very serious implications. I mean life or death – people get 
killed.’ (ibid) Local chiefs feared to engage in the issue because of its ethnic 
implications. A ‘political paralysis’ (ibid.) ensued over the issue.  So the prospect of a 
fence that served the dual function of both protecting territory for smallholders 
against crop-raids and controlling the movement of pastoralists by restricting their 
mobility, was an attractive one to smallholders, their local leaders and to the MP 
representing them.  But this repressive and overtly political function of the fence 
could never be publically referred to post 2007: public discussion of ethnicity was 
political taboo. 
 
5.2. Alignment 
The process of drawing the line of the West Laikipia Fence began in 2006 as a 
complex negotiation between the LWF and the mangers or owners of five ranches 
(numbered I to V from South to North, Table 1). These ranches varied in size, form of 
ownership, form of enterprise and attitude towards wildlife (Table 1). Initially the 
LWF proposed an alignment that would fence three ranches (I, IV and V – Figure 3). 
When the MP and the LWF presented the fence concept to these three ranch owners 
in early 2006, they were unequivocally supportive and keen to be involved.   Two 
ranches between them (II and III) were initially on the cultivation side of the fence, 
since the fence would connect the western boundaries of Ranch I to Ranch IV, 
because both ranches were not engaged with wildlife conservation or the LWF, and 
both were ‘intolerant’ of elephants. However, the owner of Ranch II turned up 
unexpectedly in the LWF offices in Nanyuki in April 2006 and persuaded the LWF to 
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include his property on the elephant side of the fence, stating his desire to turn the 
ranch into a conservancy. Ranch III soon followed suit, and also decided to be 
included on the elephant side of the fence. 
 
Ranch 
 
Size 
(acres) 
Length of 
fence 
(km) 
Ownership History  
I 63,530 31.7 Government Bought by government parastatal 
in 1975 from British settler 
(former-soldier in WW1) 
II 7,841 11.5 Private Inherited through two 
generations from British settlers 
first owning ranch in 1940 
III 5,797 15.2 Private Inherited through one generation 
from Kikuyu business man who 
bought the Ranch in 1980 
IV 37,682 17.2 Private Bought by French family in 
1980 from British settler 
(former-soldier in WW1) 
V 34,100 35.3 Private Inherited through one generation 
of white Kenyan family who 
bought ranch off British settler 
(former-soldier in WW1) in 
1970 
Table 1. Profile of ranches bordered by the West Laikipia Fence 
 
  
Figure 3. Proposed alignment of the West Laikipia Fence and location in the Laikipia-wide 
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fence 
 
Each rancher’s motivation for being included in the West Laikipia Fence centered 
primarily on their desire to control access to their land rather than any desire to 
mitigate elephant crop-raiding. Thus, the owner of Ranch V said that the fence would 
help to physically demarcate their boundary to their neighbours: 
‘The fence showed our neighbours where we began and where their land 
finished...we wanted it to stop people who had recently moved into the area 
from walking onto the ranch and claiming they didn’t know the land belonged 
to us.’ (Interview no. 36, November 2012) 
All five ranchers wanted the fence to demarcate their boundary, to exclude trespassers 
– particularly pastoralists grazing illegally – to increase the security and the 
productivity of their ranch, and secure grass stocks for their own cattle. With 
Laikipia’s variable rainfall, grass was a precious resource. On Ranch I for example, 
the manager said that they: 
‘Wanted the fence to improve grazing pastures because there was a lot of 
illegal grazing. We were being raided all over the ranch, because people on all 
sides were assessing the pasture from outside and coming in to steal grass.’ 
(Interview no. 30, September 2012) 
 
Owners of large-scale land-holdings in Laikipia faced two threats to their tenure, 
relating to the economic future of large-scale ranching, and the legitimacy of land 
rights. The search for justice by African Kenyans over access to land, had driven a 
political movement in Kenya to distribute land more equitably. Indeed by 2010, 
Kenya’s new constitution (GoK, 2010) had addressed issues of land reform and laid 
out new ‘democratic’ land–policies: one of which included a (as of yet indeterminate) 
maximum and minimum acreage of land under private ownership.  Ranchers along 
the West Laikipia Fence were concerned about the implications that this policy could 
have for their tenure.  At an emergency meeting of ranchers in Laikipia West (on 
Ranch V, December 2012), the MP for Laikipia West assured ranchers that to secure 
their properties they needed to be seen to be economically and socially productive for 
Kenya, (through tax, beef for the domestic market, and employment).  However since 
the 1990s commercial cattle ranching had faced reduced profitability following the 
privatisation (and collapse) of the Kenya Meat Commission, increased international 
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standards (which prevented Kenya from being able to export its beef to European 
markets), and increased input costs. 
The second threat to ranch tenure was the result of pastoralists’ ancestral claims to 
land. In 2004 a series of ‘walk-ons’ (mass trespasses) onto ranches in Laikipia marked 
the hundredth anniversary of the first Anglo-Maasai Treaty, between the British 
Colonial government and Maasai elders to create the Maasai Northern Reserve, which 
comprised all of Laikipia (from which they were evicted in 1911 – as described 
above). Maasai activists marked the anniversary with calls – directed at both the 
Kenyan and British governments – for compensation and the return of Laikipia to 
them, on the basis that a 99-year lease had expired (and confusing the 1904 and 1911 
Treaties, the latter of which ushered in white occupation). Maasai activists rallied 
hundreds of Maasai people, from Laikipia and Narok County, to invade private 
ranches in Laikipia. In some walk-ons, property was burned down, and stock was 
stolen. Police shot and killed a Maasai elder (Hughes, 2007).   
The walk-ons had created a ‘Zimbabwe-fear’ amongst ranchers. Many Samburu 
pastoralist interviewees claimed to share Laikipiak Maasai ancestry, as one man said: 
‘The Laikipiak people lived here and grazed their cattle in Laikipia before the 
whites came. They were the ancestors of us Samburu and Maasai. We need 
Laikipia to be returned to us – all of it. We need to be given it freely because it 
is ours.’ (Interview no. 45, November 2012) 
In the context of these threats, the West Laikipia Fence helped ranchers to legitimise 
their tenure, and to reinforce and communicate the boundaries of their properties.  In 
the process, they could show themselves as interested in protecting the livelihoods of 
their smallholder neighbours by helping prevent elephant crop raids. 
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was the final stage in the process of 
drawing the line of the West Laikipia Fence.  A private company completed the EIA 
in January 2007, proposing the same alignment as that put forward by the LWF, on 
the basis that it followed existing ranch boundaries and therefore would be easy to 
maintain. Unlike LWF’s proposal, the EIA recognised that both agriculture and 
pastoralism co-existed along the proposed fence and described the presence of 
‘Samburu squatters’ there (Thiane, 2007: 22).  It was noted that ‘unless arrangements 
are put in place to provide access routes for livestock in some areas, this fence could 
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affect these pastoralists negatively’ (ibid: 35). The security benefits of the fence to 
ranchers and smallholders through reduced illegal grazing and stock theft were seen 
to outweigh the costs to pastoralist squatters.  In this way, the EIA effectively 
prioritised the interests of landed stakeholders over those of pastoralists.  
 
The final proposed alignment of the West Laikipia Fence traced the hard boundary 
separating the five ranches from land used for smallholder cultivation and for 
subsistence livestock production and stretched up across a sub-divided former settler 
ranch (where the majority of plots had not been allocated or settled) to join the fenced 
boundary of Ranch VI (Figure 3). To follow Newman (2006: 148), the demarcation of 
boundaries comprises a process ‘through which borders are constructed and the 
categories of difference or separation created’, rather than simply ‘the drawing of a 
line on a map or the construction of a fence in the physical landscape’. Newman’s 
observation that the alignment of borders is typically determined by political and 
social élites, also holds true for the West Laikipia Fence.  The interests of two 
stakeholder groups with power and purchase over land came together in drawing the 
line of the West Laikipia Fence. In creating the case for a fence, the concerns of the 
numerous smallholders were identified, voiced, and supported by the MP.  In 
selecting the line of the fence, the interests of the small number of large-scale land 
owners was decisive, as they owned the land on which the fence was to be built.  
Driven by divergent motivations, these actors were able to order not only 
relationships between elephants and farmers but also relationships within society: 
among pastoralists, smallholders and ranchers.  
 
Interestingly, although the rhetoric used by the LWF and the MP describing the West 
Laikipia Fence focused on its technical, developmental and environmental impacts, 
the Kenyan media picked up on the polarised politics that underpinned it. An article 
published in the weekly newspaper The East African, was entitled ‘The haves and 
have nots’ (Mbaria, 2006). In it, Mbaria described how plans to complete the final 
trans-Laikipia fence were ‘being seen as a ploy to separate white ranchers from 
peasants’ and how the fence will end up ‘splitting the country into two unequal parts’ 
as it makes way for a ‘huge conservation site’ (Mbaria, 2006: 6). 
 
6.  Constructing the fence 
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The West Laikipia Fence Committee agreed in July 2007 on a uniform design for the 
entire West Laikipia Fence, using standard solar-powered technology.  Individual 
ranchers could then modify the fence as they wished. Seventy kilometers of fence 
were built during ‘phase one’ of construction by an independent contractor along the 
western boundaries of ranches I, II; the northern boundary of Ranch III; and 12km of 
Ranch IV’s western boundary, and all were completed by 2008. The remaining forty 
kilometers of fence of ‘phase two’ were built along Ranch IV’s northern boundary 
and Ranch V’s western boundary by the ranches themselves, to reduce costs (Figure 
3). The northern-most stretch of fence, extending from Ranch V to join Ranch VI’s 
boundary fence, was never built, since the unoccupied land there was effectively an 
open access grazing area. In 2008, Samburu and Pokot pastoralists engaged in a two-
year, bloody conflict over access to grazing. The LWF Director decided that this 
length of fence was unfeasible because of insecurity from the violence and because 
the social and financial capital did not exist there to maintain the fence.  
 
Construction of phases one and two progressed slowly. When the owner of Ranch IV 
returned to Europe with illness, the ranch manager was left unable to authorise and 
commit the labour required to build his length of fence, and reported equipment going 
missing from the ranch store. Completion of Ranch V’s length of the fence that 
adjoined Ranch IV’s fence was stalled until Ranch IV’s fence was completed.  
Construction of phase two was completed by the end of 2011.  
 
The final alignment chosen for the fence left two pockets of smallholder cultivation 
on the wrong side, Matigari and Mathira (Figure 4). Once phase one had been 
completed, these areas began to experience intense crop-raiding from elephants. The 
LWF therefore agreed to train and resource the community of smallholders at 
Matigari to build their own 2km long electrified ring-fence to encircle the area of 
cultivation. The community worked efficiently and cohesively and the ring-fence was 
completed by June 2009. Having heard about the Matigari ring-fence, Mathira 
residents voiced similar grievances to LWF and the KWS, saying that Mathira had 
become ‘a highway for elephants’ (Interview no. 4, January 2012). LWF decided that 
the community would also be resourced by LWF with equipment, training and a 
technician to build an 8km ring-fence around Mathira, which was completed in early 
2011.  
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The final West Laikipia Fence was therefore 121km long and ran just within the ranch 
boundaries of five different large-scale ranches and around two areas of irrigated 
smallholder cultivation (Figure 4). It had four live wires and one earth wire held up by 
seven-foot posts spaced 10 metres apart. Energiser houses containing the solar panels 
each powered approximately 5km length of fence. The fence was built to achieve a 
voltage of 7Kv.  
 
  Figure 4.  Final alignment of the West Laikipia Fence 
 
7. Maintaining the fence 
The effectiveness of electrified elephant fences depends on their delivering a short 
high-voltage, low current, electric shock when touched and the circuit between the 
wires, the earth and the body touching the fence is completed.  Power is generated by 
solar panels, and stored in lead acid accumulators. Fences are easily broken if the 
posts are weak, the wires poorly attached to the post, or if voltage falls.  The most 
frequent cause for low voltage is shorting from vegetation, for example long grass, or 
from badly connected wires because of poor repair.  Fences therefore need to be well 
built, and well-maintained, with regular clearance of growing vegetation and timely 
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and efficient repair.  
 
Elephants began to break the West Laikipia Fence even while it was being 
constructed.  Voltage began to vary along the fence as investment in and capacity for 
maintenance varied between properties (Evans, 2014).  The MP lost his campaign and 
failed to be re-elected.  Furthermore the complex political reality of the social 
landscape in which the West Laikipia Fence was situated became clear as the fence 
was constructed. Once built, the West Laikipia Fence line began to be pushed and 
pulled by the political interests of different stakeholders.  Previously silent 
stakeholders began to forge a stake in it. The final form of the fence was therefore the 
result of fine scale negotiations.  
 
The process of building the fence accentuated and concentrated conflicts between 
stakeholders. During the construction of the fence, pastoralists – who had been silent 
during the planning of the fence – became noticeable as stakeholders. As discussed 
above, their interests in relation to access to land and resources stood in stark contrast 
with those of other land users.  Their presence led to adaptations of the original fence 
layout in various ways.  Three examples show how the resulting interactions shaped 
the physical state of the fence. 
 
The first example comprises ranchers who began to adapt the fence to suit their own 
interests in relation to land. A year after Ranch II’s length of fence had been built, and 
despite the owner’s initial conservation-centric sentiment, he drove all elephants from 
his property and enclosed the whole ranch with an electrified fence. He added two 
more energisers to give an average voltage of 11Kv. He added outriggers in places 
where elephants had previously broken into the ranch. Elephants, he explained, 
damaged ranch infrastructure: 
‘I had to change all the tanks, all the pipes, you couldn’t walk anywhere when 
elephants were here. I remember one elephant following me for 5km. Without 
elephants we can get on with business.’ (Interview no. 32, November 2012) 
 
It is no accident that this strategy was also effective against incursions by pastoralists, 
who at various points began to undermine the West Laikipia Fence:  by crossing 
beneath or through its wires or by breaking it.  The owner of Ranch II adapted his 
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fence management to be as impenetrable as possible to trespassers: ‘no fence is 
people proof, it’s how you manage it that makes it people proof’ (ibid.). He slept with 
a radio by his ear.  If there were reports of people crossing the fence he would go in 
his Land Cruiser and drive off offenders, impounding pastoralist cattle and imposing a 
hefty fine. As he told me,  ‘I work flat out to make this place work. This grass is for 
my cows and no one else’ (ibid.).  For the same purpose, Ranch III added vertical 
strands to the main fence, connecting the live wires, so that pastoralists could not 
enter the property. 
 
The second example is along a section of the West Laikipia Fence that borders the 
Pesi swamp next to Ranch I (Figure 4). Many smallholders had bought land next to 
the Pesi swamp, southwest of the proposed alignment of the Ranch I’s length of the 
West Laikipia Fence and were cultivating there by pumping water from the swamp. 
These smallholders wanted the fence to be northeast of the swamp to allow them 
access to water to irrigate their crops. However the Kenya Wildlife Service, having 
surveyed the planned fence line, argued that the fence must be southwest of the 
swamp, and outside Ranch I, to ensure that elephants had access to water in the 
swamp, otherwise they would break the fence to reach the swamp. Ranch I supported 
the Kenya Wildlife Service’s argument saying that they wanted to develop a 
conservancy on the land and therefore wanted to maximise elephant habitat.  The real 
motivation of Ranch I’s management, however, was to prevent pastoralists crossing 
into the ranch to access water in the swamp and grass in the ranch. The ranch manager 
said: ‘The water belongs to the ranch. It is for our cows and the elephants. We don’t 
want people taking their cows to the water then walking onto the ranch and stealing 
all the grass. The fence keeps them on their side.’ (Interview no. 30, November 2012) 
 
As fence construction began along the Pesi swamp, pastoralists began to cross, break 
and undermine the fence. As one pastoralist neighbour at Pesi told us: 
‘No one asked us about where we thought the fence should go. [Ranch I] built 
that fence to deny our cows access to water. So we will just pass through it 
and take our cows there to drink when we want.’ (Interview no. 42, September 
2012) 
Another said: ‘I’m not going to let my cows starve, when I look across the fence and 
see all of that grass.’ (Interview no. 51, December 2012). The LWF mediated the 
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conflicting interests and compromised with a design that zig-zagged across the swamp 
so that pastoralists, smallholders and elephants could all access water. However the 
LWF fencing strategy had specifically warned that there were ‘serious technical 
difficulties’ in a configuration that crossed water because of the difficulty of 
accessing the wires if they needed repairing (Thouless et al., 2002: 4).  Indeed, the 
fence at Pesi never functioned effectively as a barrier.  It consistently had low voltage 
and its wires lay dangling in the water. The LWF Director described the demarcation 
of the West Laikipia Fence: 
‘It went through all sorts of bizarre incarnations. It was a bloody disaster. 
Different interests were pulling it everywhere, along with a lack of experience. 
We were trying to maximise space for elephants as good greenies and of 
course the solution would have been…to avoid Pesi swamp completely.’  
(Interview no. 22, September 2012) 
 
The third example is amongst stakeholders in the Mathira ring-fence. The people 
living within the Mathira ring-fence were all smallholder farmers. They wanted a 
ring-fence to follow the same design as the rest of the West Laikipia Fence. However 
they were surrounded by pastoralists, who had moved into the area to settle. LWF 
worked with smallholders to construct a five-strand fence with five live wires evenly 
spaced from ground to seven-feet high: consistent with the rest of the West Laikipia 
Fence. However this design also prevented the movement of other animals, including 
livestock. Pastoralists resident in the area protested, demanding a design with three 
raised strands that left space to allow their cattle access to water in the Mathira swamp 
(Figure 4) and pasture within the fence, while still deterring elephants. Smallholder 
residents within the proposed fence disputed this design. They said that only a five-
strand fence would deter elephants. However elephants were not their only concern. 
Smallholders were also seeking a fence that would exclude pastoralists and reinforce 
their territory. As one (smallholder) village leader at Mathira told us: 
‘It just isn’t true that Mathira farmers only wanted the fence to keep elephants 
away from their farms. They also wanted to keep pastoralists out of their 
land…pastoralists come onto their farms with their cattle at night, their cows 
eat their crops.’ (Interview no. 52, January 2012) 
Pastoralists threatened to sabotage a five-strand fence if it was built. LWF attempted 
to mediate these different interests and compromised by selecting the three raised-
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strand design, through which livestock could pass. 
 
These examples show the complex interactions among smallholders, ranchers and 
pastoralists over the fence.  These centred on its alignment, and it management (with 
some stakeholders deliberately undermining its effectiveness, or breaking it). For 
ranchers, the fence helped consolidate their moral and legal claim to their land. For 
smallholders the fence had symbolic and material significance in terms of land rights, 
controlling access to water, and access to their land by pastoralists.  For pastoralists 
the West Laikipia Fence symbolically embodied ideas about their historical loss of 
land rights, and directly affected their everyday de facto access to land and water.  
Pastoralists began to assert their views through the threat of subversive action even 
during the process of construction, and continued such action after completion, with 
significant effects on the fence’s effectiveness:  breaking the fence and creating gaps 
through which elephants passed. Both pastoralists and elephants resisted the spatial 
ordering that was being imposed on them by the fence, and its smallholder and 
rancher supporters, seeking to secure their territory through physically breaking 
through fences. Their ability to do so was dependent on the actions of ranchers and 
this varied between properties:  some ranchers fortified and enforced their fences, 
whilst others failed to repair broken fences and wires sagged and lost voltage.  The 
divergent politics of different actors were therefore materially relevant to the fence’s 
central purpose:  in determining its effectiveness as a barrier to elephant movement 
(Evans, 2014). 
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that while the construction of an ‘elephant fence’ built to 
reduce HEC was presented as a technical solution to HEC, it was in fact an inherently 
political process.  In theory, the West Laikipia Fence provided a spatial solution to the 
conflict that results when people and elephants share space. However, the territory it 
created on the ground was captured by the different political interests of various 
stakeholders.  By attempting to create separate spaces for elephants (on ranches) and 
for smallholder cultivation, the fence seemed to offer a simple, high-profile solution 
to the complex problem of HEC that appealed to much of the LWF’s diverse 
membership, to the Kenya Wildlife Service with its stretched resources for mitigating 
HEC, and to the Dutch Government in terms of their development and conservation 
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objectives for bilateral aid in Kenya.   
 
The fence, however, had other effects.  It was not just a technical intervention, but 
also a highly political one (c.f. Ferguson 1990). Through its physical structure and 
technical function, its different political and social meanings and impacts were 
hidden. It bolstered the political campaign of an aspiring MP by securing territory for 
his smallholder constituents. It helped smallholders to secure their land from intrusion 
from not only crop-raiding elephants, but also from pastoralists competing for 
grazing.  It enabled ranchers to physically demarcate their properties and to exclude 
trespassers, and in one case, elephants. The fence allowed ranchers to show 
themselves to be helping their neighbours, whilst simultaneously legitimising their 
boundaries and maintaining their separate territories. The conflicting political 
motivations of stakeholders were manifested once the fence turned into a physical 
reality. Previously silent stakeholders began to assert their stake in the fence. 
Pastoralists contested the alignment, design and construction of the fence, demanding 
that it accommodated their needs and not just those of smallholders. Meanwhile ranch 
owners continued to reinforce their interest in relation to land by building stronger, 
more impenetrable fences.  
 
We conclude that the resulting physical form of an ‘elephant fence’ reflected the 
power dynamics and politics of different stakeholders.  The power dynamics between 
stakeholders involved in the boundary making of the West Laikipia Fence resonate 
with Laikipia’s history of exclusion and inclusion. There were two waves of inclusion 
in Laikipia: the colonial government setting aside Laikipia as ‘the White Highlands’ 
and the purchase and settlement of sub-divided former ranches by Kikuyu 
smallholders. This article has shown that through the demarcation of the West 
Laikipia Fence, large-scale landowners and Kikuyu politicians continue to hold power 
in the landscape and are able define how it is spatially ordered. Maasai pastoralist 
early occupants of Laikipia were physically and forcibly excluded from Laikipia by 
the colonial government, having moved into Laikipia after being promised it as a 
Maasai Reserve. The fence physically excluded pastoralists’ access to land. A fence, 
therefore, cannot be separated from the political landscape in which it is embedded 
and which it defines and exacerbates.  Furthermore the politics between human actors 
were not just significant in themselves but were also important in the extent to which 
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the fence functions as a barrier to elephants. 
 
Fences are increasingly being built throughout elephant range, in Asia and Africa, to 
order the relationship between people and elephants.  This seemingly simple technical 
solution to a conservation problem can reinforce and restructure the social and 
political landscape in which it exists. We recommend that the social and political 
contexts of electrified fences built to mitigate HEC are assessed and considered in the 
planning and construction as thoroughly as the ecological context in which they are 
situated and which they control. 
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